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RESUMEN
Se presenta un Modelo de Equilibrio General Aplicado para simular los efectos de una Reforma
Impositiva Medioambiental en una economía regional (Andalucía, España). La reforma incluye un
impuesto sobre las emisiones de CO2 o SO2 compensado por el Impuesto Sobre la Renta o la Cuota
Patronal a la Seguridad Social, bajo la hipótesis de déficit público constante. Esta aproximación nos
permite evaluar la posibilidad de existencia de doble dividendo, analizando los efectos sobre el
bienestar tanto medioambientales como no medioambientales. En la economía analizada, se
produce doble dividendo en la compensación con reducción de Cuota Patronal a la Seguridad Social,
ante el gravamen de las emisiones de CO2 , junto con un (reducido) doble dividendo fuerte. No se
aprecia doble dividendo cuando se aplica la reforma medioambiental con el Impuesto sobre la
Renta.
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ABSTRACT
We use a Computable General Equilibrium model to simulate the effects of an Environmental Tax
Reform in a regional economy (Andalusia, Spain). The reform involves imposing a tax on CO2 or
SO2 emissions and reducing either the Income Tax or the payroll tax of employers to Social Security,
and eventually keeping public deficit unchanged. This approach enables us to test the so-called
double dividend hypothesis, which states that this kind of reform is likely to improve both
environmental and non-environmental welfare. In the economy under analysis, an employment
double dividend arises when the payroll tax is reduced and, if CO2 emissions are selected as
environmental target, a (limited) strong double could also be obtained. No double dividend appears
when Income Tax is reduced to compensate the environmental tax.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Some economists have argued that an environmental tax reform (ETR henceforth)
consisting of taxing polluting emissions and recycling the so-obtained revenue by 
reducing other distorting taxes, in such a way that public revenue remains unchanged, 
can give rise to the so-called double dividend, that is, an environmental improvement
(green dividend) and a reduction of fiscal distortions (blue dividend) so that non-
environmental welfare would also increase. 
The relevance of a double dividend has to do with the practical implementability of an 
ETR. Any environmental policy is likely to have some economic costs by worsening the 
performance of some economic variables, such as production, employment, inflation, 
and ultimately (non-environmental) welfare. To make a decision, a benefit-cost analysis 
is needed, in order to compare the environmental benefits and the economic costs from 
such a policy. The most difficult part of this analysis is how to measure environmental
benefits, which do not usually have a market value. Nevertheless, if a double dividend 
exists, it is possible to improve the environmental quality without any cost in terms of 
non-environmental economic welfare. In this case, it can be argued that the fiscal 
reform is desirable even without an explicit valuation of the environmental benefits. 
Note that the environmental policy could be justified by itself, even it has some 
economic cost; in this sense, the fact that a double dividend exists is a sufficient, but not 
a necessary condition, to justify an ETR.
According to Mooij (1999), there is a consensus among all the authors concerning the 
definition of the green dividend, but there exist different versions of the blue dividend.
The so-called weak double dividend version states that the social welfare is higher when
an environmental tax is compensated by reducing a distorting tax rather than by a lump-
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sum transfer. A strong double dividend exists if, apart from the environmental
improvement, the non-environmental welfare is greater after performing the reform than 
before. Finally, an employment double dividend happens if the employment level 
increases after the reform, as compared with the situation before the reform.
Basically all economists agree that there exists a green dividend, and most of them also 
agree that a double weak dividend is also likely to exist, but there is a controversial
debate about the strong double dividend and the employment double dividend. The
theoretical literature has not obtained clear-cut conclusions so far, but it suggests that 
the possibility to obtain a double dividend is low and it is subject to very stringent 
conditions about tax recycling. Pearce (1991), Repetto et.al. (1992), Nordhaus (1993) or 
Grubb (1993) among others argue that it is possible to improve tax efficiency by means
of an ETR, while others, as Bovenberg and Mooij (1994) argue that this is not possible, 
in general, because environmental taxes are likely to increase, rather than reduce,
previous distortions. 
Parry (1995) points out the relevance of choosing a partial equilibrium or a general 
equilibrium approach to answer this question. Partial equilibrium models do not take 
into account the interactions between environmental taxes and previous distortions, and 
these effects tend to cause the double dividend to hold in partial equilibrium models but 
not in general equilibrium models. This is because the environmental tax eventually
falls on labor income, so that labor taxes and emission taxes distort the labor market in a 
similar way. However labor taxes are more efficient from the levying point of view 
because environmental taxes also distort the relative prices between polluting and non-
polluting goods, which erodes the tax base. So, from a non-environmental point of view, 
emission taxes are likely to cause a larger excess of burden. 
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Notwithstanding, the economic literature also describes some mechanisms that may 
cause a strong double dividend, or an employment double dividend to happen in a 
general equilibrium framework. An ETR could facilitate wage moderation and the 
reduction of labor market distortions in a situation in which imperfect competition has
led to excessively high wages (Brunello, 1996; Carraro et.al., 1996). Bovenberg (1994) 
and Carraro and Soubeyran (1996) show that, if the initial tax system is suboptimal
from a non-environmental point of view, an ETR can simultaneously reduce pollution 
and unemployment. We can conclude that opportunities to get a double dividend 
typically arise when there exist some market failures or some imperfections in the tax 
system (see also Bovenberg and Goulder, 2002). For a survey on ETR and the double 
dividend, see Mooij (1999) or Goulder (1995). 
Given the difficulties to obtain clear-cut theoretical conclusions, it makes sense to
perform an empirical analysis to test the economic effects of a specific reform in a 
selected country or region, by means of a suitable applied model. A number of authors, 
like Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), Bye (2000), Dessus and Bussolo (1998), Wender
(2001), Xie and Saltzman (2000) o Yang (2001), have used Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE henceforth) models to assess the economic effects of an ETR. These 
models perform a disaggregate representation of all the activity sectors and the
equilibrium of all markets, according to basic microeconomic principles. 
In Spain, Manresa and Sancho (2002), Gomez-Plana et.al. (2003)  and Labandeira et.al. 
(2003) use CGE models to simulate the effect of environmental tax reforms nationwide. 
We are not aware of any application in the regional level. In this paper a CGE model is 
used to evaluate the environmental and economic effects of an ETR in a regional 
economy, in this case, Andalusia (Spain). Specifically, four simulations are made, by 
combining the introduction of a tax on CO2 or SO2 emissions with a reduction in 
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Income Tax (IT hereafter) or in the payroll tax of the employers to Social Security (PT 
hereafter). We use an extension of the model by Cardenete and Sancho (2003), 
including polluting emissions and emission taxes. 
The results show that an employment double dividend is likely to arise when the PT is 
reduced to compensate the environmental tax. In the case of the CO2 tax, a strong 
double dividend is also obtained for low values of the environmental tax. No 
(employment or strong) double dividend exists when the environmental tax revenue is 
recycled by reducing the IT. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 displays the most important
features of the CGE model
1 and the databases. Section 3 presents and justifies the 
simulations performed, and specifically, the pollutants to be taxed and the selected tax
combinations. Section 4 summarizes the results and offers some economic
interpretations. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. THE MODEL AND THE DATABASES
2.1. The model 
The model comprises 24 productive sectors, after aggregation of the 1990 Input-Output
tables of Andalusia. The production technology is given by a nested production 
function. The domestic output of sector j, measured in euros and denoted by Xdj, is
obtained by combining, through a Leontief technology, outputs (including energy) from 
the rest of sectors and the value added VAj. In turn, this value added is from primary
inputs (labor, L, and capital, K), combined by a Cobb-Douglas technology. Overall 
output of sector j, Qj, is obtained from a Cobb-Douglas combination of domestic output 
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and imports Xrowj, according to the Armington hypothesis (1969), in which domestic
and imported products are taken as imperfect substitutes.
The government raises taxes to obtain public revenue
2, as well as it gives transfers to the 
private sector, TPS, and demands goods and services, GDj. PD gives the final balance
(surplus or deficit) of the public budget
3:
j j p GD cpi TPS R PD         ( 1 )
cpi being the Consumer Price Index and pj a production price index before Value Added 
Tax (VAT hereafter) referring to all goods produced by sector j. Tax revenue includes 
that raised from the environmental tax.
Let Ej denote polluting emissions from sector j, measured in CO2 or SO2 tons. Then, we
have the following equation, which assumes a linear relationship between production 
and emissions:
Ej = Įj Qj      ( 2 )
where Įj measures the amount of pollution for every euro of output produced in sector j.
The technical parameter Įj accounts for the differences in pollution intensities across
sectors. Typically, very energy-intensive sectors (and, especially fossil-fuels-intensive)
are also very polluting (and hence display a high value of Įj)
4.
The government imposes a tax of t euros per ton of emissions. As a consequence, each
sector j pays 
Tj = t Ej      ( 3 )
Note that the different pollution intensity across sectors causes that the same tax on 
pollution implies a different economic burden with respect to output. Substituting (2)
into (3), the amount to be paid by sector j can be written as 
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Tj = ȕj Qj      ( 4 )
where ȕj = t Įj is the marginal and average tax rate of sector j in terms of euro paid per
euro produced (see equation A.8 in the appendix for the exact specification of the 
environmental tax in the CGE model). 
There is only one foreign sector, which comprises the rest of Spain, Europe and the rest 
of the world. The balance of this sector is given by
¦ ¦
   






j EXP rowp TROW IMP rowp ROWD   (5) 
where IMPj denotes imports of sector j, EXPj exports of sector j and TROW transfers
from abroad for the consumer. ROWD is the balance of the external sector. 
Final demand comes from investment, exports and consumption demand from 
households. In our model, there exist 24 different goods –corresponding to productive 
sectors- and a representative consumer who demands present consumption goods and 
saves the remainder of her disposable income. Consumer income (YD henceforth)
equals labor and capital income, plus transfers, minus direct taxes: 
YD=  w L+ r K + cpi TPS +TROW -  DT (r K + cpi TPS +TROW)
- DT (w L - WC w L) - WC w L (6)
where w and r denote input (labor and capital) prices and L and K input quantities sold 
by the consumer, DT is the IT rate and WC the tax rate corresponding to the payment of 
the employees to Social Security (ESS hereafter). The consumer’s objective is to 
maximize her welfare, subject to her budget constraint. Welfare is obtained from 
consumption goods CDj (j = 1,…, 24) and savings SD, -according to a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function: 
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YD SD p CD p s.t.























  (7) 
pinv being an investment price index. 
Regarding investment and saving, this is a saving driven model. The closure rule is 
defined in such a way that investment is exogenous, savings are determined from the 
consumer’s decision and both variables are related with the public and foreign sectors
by the following identity: 
¦
 
   
24
1 j
inv j ROWD PD SDpinv p INV    (8) 
Labor and capital demands are computed under the assumption that firms minimize the 
cost of producing value added. In the capital market we consider that supply is perfectly 
inelastic. In the labor market, there is a feedback between the real wage rate and the
unemployment rate. This feedback somehow represents rigidities in the labor market
that are related to the power of unions or other friction inducing factors (see Kehoe et al. 
















      ( 9 )
where u and u  are the unemployment rates in the simulation and in the benchmark
equilibrium respectively, and  T  is an elasticity constant that represents the degree of 
flexibility of the real wage (as is usual in similar studies, we set  T equal to 1). This 
formulation is consistent with an institutional setting where the workers decide real
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wage taking into account the unemployment rate -according to equation (9)- and 
employers decide the amount of labor. 
The activity levels of public and foreign sectors are fixed, while the relative prices and
the activity levels of the productive sectors are endogenous variables. 
The equilibrium of the economy is given by a price vector for all goods and inputs, a 
vector of activity levels, and a value for public income such that the consumer is 
maximizing her utility, the productive sectors are maximizing its profits (net of taxes), 
public income equals the payments of all economic agents, and supply equals demand in
all markets.
This CGE model follows the basic principles of the walrasian equilibrium -as in Scarf
and Shoven (1984), Ballard et al. (1985) or Shoven and Whalley (1992)-, enlarged by 
including both public and foreign sectors and explicitly accounting for polluting 
emissions.
2.2. Databases and calibration 
The main data used in this paper come from the 1990 social accounting matrix for
Andalusia (SAM hereafter, see Cardenete, 1998). Emission data are obtained from the
1990 environmental Input-Output tables for Andalusia (TIOMA90), carried out by the 
regional environmental agency
5, which show real observed data on different air 
pollutants released from 74 activity sectors, which were aggregated into 24 to match the 
SAM structure. There is a more recent SAM for Andalusia, specifically, from 1995. 
Unfortunately, as there are no, disaggregate enough, official pollution data by sectors, 
for any year after 1990, we have decided to use the 1990 SAM for the sake of 
consistency.
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The numerical values for the economic parameters are obtained by the usual procedure 
of calibration (see, for example, Mansur and Whalley, 1984). Specifically, the following 
parameters are calibrated: all the technical coefficients of the production functions, all 
the tax rates (except for the environmental tax) and the coefficients of the utility
function. The environmental coefficients Įj are obtained from equation (2), i.e., dividing 
the observed amount of pollution by the amount of output for every sector. The 
calibration criterion is that of reproducing the 1990 SAM as an initial equilibrium for 
the economy, which is used as a benchmark for all the simulations. In such an 
equilibrium, all the prices and the activity levels are set equal to one, so that, after the 
simulation, it is possible to observe directly the change rate of relative prices and 
activity levels. The amount of pollution for sector j is simulated by multiplying the
output of that sector by the calibrated value of parameter Įj.
The SAM comprises 24 industry sectors, two inputs (labor and capital), a 
saving/investment account, a government account, direct taxes (IT and ESS) and 
indirect taxes (PT, VAT, output tax and tariffs), a foreign sector and a representative 
consumer.
3. SIMULATIONS PERFORMED
In the simulations performed in this paper, we assume that a tax is imposed on the CO2
or SO2 emissions. The revenue obtained from such a tax is recycled by reducing PT or 
IT, so that, four different policy combinations are simulated.
It is well known that Carbon and Sulfur Oxides are among the main polluting 
substances released to the atmosphere. In Andalusia, more than one million tons of SO2
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and CO2 are released every year (Consejería de Medio Ambiente
6, 2001), being industry 
and road transport the most polluting sectors. 
We have chosen CO2 because of its well known severe impacts on the ozone layer, 
global warming, and climate change, which have forced some governments to impose 
taxes on CO2 emissions in order to cut them down (Bosquet, 2000). Given the global 
effects of this pollutant, a tax on CO2 emissions is more likely to be set in the national
rather than regional level, so the results concerning this pollutant can be interpreted as 
the likely regional effects of a hypothetical national tax reform. Regarding SO2,it is one
of the main air pollutants in Andalusia and its local effects make it a suitable aim for a 
regional environmental policy. Chemical and energy industries are the main responsible 
for the emissions, accounting for about 77 % of the overall SO2 emissions in 1990
7
(Sociedad para el Desarrollo Energético de Andalucía, 1994-2000). 
Regarding the taxes to be reduced for recycling revenue, we have selected the payroll tax 
(PT) and income tax (IT). PT is perhaps the one which has been analyzed more deeply in 
the literature (Bosquet, 2000), perhaps partly because of the concern about 
unemployment in Europe (see, for example, Blanchard and Katz, 1997). The
unemployment problem is especially severe in Spain (see, for example, Blanchard et.al., 
1995) and even more in Andalusia
8. As we have discussed in the introduction,
opportunities to get a double dividend typically arise when there exist some market
failures or some imperfections in the tax system. The high unemployment rate in 
Andalusia can be interpreted as a sign that some market and/or fiscal imperfections exist,
suggesting that there could be some room to improve the tax system and get some
efficiency gains. Regarding PT, we should remark that, according to the Spanish law, 
this tax could be modified only by the central Spanish government, and not by a regional 
government. Therefore, as this paper focuses on the economic effects of an ETR in a 
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regional economy, the results involving this tax can be interpreted, first, as measuring
the regional effects of a hypothetic reform performed from the central government or, 
second, as measuring the potential gains for the regional economy if the local 
government received power to modify this tax in the future.
As for the IT, we have found very few empirical related references as for this tax, 
despite the recommendations of the European Commission (Durán, 2001). Nevertheless, 
this tax is included in the analysis, first, because of its great relevance in the Spanish Tax 
System, and second, because regional governments have a (limited) ability to manage 
this tax, so that a reform involving IT can be performed more easily in a regional 
economy than one involving PT. 
Combining both pollutants and both taxes, we obtain four possible ETR’s. Among the
four, the SO2/IT combination is the most plausible from a regional point of view, while 
the CO2/PT combination is the most plausible from a national point of view. The other
two intermediate cases are also simulated for the sake of completeness. The (regional)
economic effects of each one are simulated, focusing specially on Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) and Disposable Income (YD) in real terms, Equivalent Variation (EV) as 
a measure of consumer (non-environmental) welfare, unemployment and inflation. This 
information allows us to discuss the existence of a (strong or employment) double 
dividend for the economy under study. 
As noted by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), an environmental tax is likely to introduce 
further economic (non-environmental) distortions. When another distorting tax is 
reduced as compensation, there are two opposite effects, which yield an ambiguous
result, depending on how distorting the tax to be reduced is. If we reduce a very strongly
(slightly) distorting tax, it might provide a welfare improvement that could (could not) 
compensate the distortion introduced by the environmental tax, in order to give a final 
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positive (negative) impact on non-environmental welfare. This reasoning could also 
work the other way round: if we observe that an ETR provides a positive (negative)
overall effect on welfare, we can conclude that the tax that has been reduced is more 
(less) distorting than the environmental tax. 
As the magnitude of both types of emissions is very different
9, the value of the tax rates
has to be set in sensible levels regarding the fiscal pressure they impose on the firms.
Instead of performing the simulation for a single value of the environmental tax rate (as
in other related articles), in order to obtain more accurate quantitative information
concerning the sensitivity of different economic variables, we perform the simulation for 
a parametric range, with a minimum of Į=0,5 and a maximum of 3 euros per unit of 
pollutant (tons for SO2 and thousand tons for CO2). These values imply an average tax 
rate on sales (Esee equation (4) above) that roughly ranges from 0,7% to 4% in the SO2
reform and from 0,17% to 1.06% in the CO2 reform. In every simulation, once the
environmental tax rate is exogenously fixed, the compensating tax (PT or IT) is 
decreased with the criterion of keeping real public deficit unchanged. There is no 
minimum exempt, so that, firms have to pay from the first polluting unit.
10
4. RESULTS 
Given the different magnitude of both substances, it is not suitable to perform a precise 
quantitative comparison between the results concerning both pollutants. So, every 
reform is simulated separately, quantitative comparisons can be made for reforms on the 
same pollutant, and just some general qualitative comparisons can be made across 
different pollutants. 
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First, we focus on the reforms involving a tax on CO2 emissions. Table 1 displays the 
main results, including the change rate (%) of emissions, real GDP, real YD,
unemployment and Consumer Price Index (CPI hereafter) with respect to the 
benchmark situation, as well as EV with respect to the benchmark situation. 
When the CO2 tax is compensated with PT, emissions monotonically decrease with the 
tax rate, as expected. Nominal Output and Income decrease, but as prices also decrease, 
both GDP and YD increase in real terms. Nevertheless, while real GDP monotonically 
increases with the tax rate, YD reaches a maximum (0,03 % increment with respect to
the benchmark value) when the environmental tax rate equals 1.5 euros per thousand 
tons, and decreases from that point on (although, it keeps above the benchmark level). 
As a consequence of lower labor costs, unemployment rate monotonically decreases, 
reaching a reduction larger than 3%, so that an employment double dividend arises.
Non-environmental welfare, as measured by EV, also increases monotonically for tax 
rates smaller or equal than 2.5, and it reaches a maximum at this point and decreases for
larger values. This event fulfills the definition of strong double dividend. In fact, this 
simulation is the only one that shows a (limited) strong double dividend result. These 
results follow the evidence obtained by several economists, concerning the  strongly 
distorting effects of labor taxes, and more specifically, the payroll tax in the Spanish 
Tax System
11. The reduction in this tax overpowers the distorting effects of the
environmental tax. 
INSERT TABLE 1 
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When the CO2 tax is compensated by reducing Income Tax, no (strong or employment)
double dividend follows. Emissions reduce, as expected, but all economic variables
monotonically worsen: real GDP and YD decrease, CPI increases (with an inflation rate 
up to 1,5 %), as well as unemployment rate (with an increment up to 4,25%). In this
case, we can conclude that the distorting effects of the environmental tax (which depress 
consumption and economic activity) overpower the incentive effect from reducing IT.
By comparing the economic effects of both reforms (figure 1), we can see that the most
sensitive variable is unemployment, showing the highest change rate in absolute value
(positive in the first reform, and specially negative in the second) among all the variables
under study. 
Note also that the emission reduction is larger in the IT reform (up to 2%) than in the PT 
reform (hardly 1%). To understand this difference, we can rationalize the final effect of 
the ETR on emissions, as being the result of combining two separate mechanisms that 
can be called scale effect and substitution effect. Regarding the former, given that 
pollution is a consequence of economic activity, any policy that fosters or depresses
economic activity tends to increase or decrease polluting emissions as a side effect. On 
the other hand, the environmental tax incentivates the activity of cleaner sectors and 
disincentivates that of dirtier ones, in such a way that, apart from changing the scale of 
the economic activities, their composition is altered as well (substitution effect). The 
latter effect is likely to be always negative (that is, to reduce emissions), while the sign 
of the scale effects is ambiguous because it depends on the impact on economic activity. 
In the IT reform, the decrease in the activity level induces further emission reductions, 
so both scale and substitution effects are negative, while the PT reform fosters economic
activity and causes an indirect increasing effect on emissions (positive scale effect)
which absorbs part of the (negative) substitution effect. 
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We can conclude that the IT reform is more successful concerning environmental
effects, but imposes higher economic costs, while the income tax reform has slighter 
environmental effects, but does not appear to have any cost in terms of non-
environmental welfare. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
No strong double dividend arises when reducing PT compensates a SO2 tax, as non-
environmental welfare (as measured by EV) decreases. In this case, we get a significant
relative reduction in emissions (larger than 6% for the largest scope of the reform) and a 
reduction in prices but output and income decrease. As labor costs reduce, an 
employment double dividend is obtained (unemployment rate decreases up to 5%). 
Finally, when a SO2 tax is compensated by reducing IT, we obtain the worst results for 
all the economic variables. First, note that non-environmental welfare (as measured by 
EV) monotonically decreases with the tax rate, so that no strong double dividend exists. 
Regarding other economic variables, although nominal GDP and YD increase when the 
scope of the reform is small, this increment is overpowered by a high inflation rate 
(ranging from 1.2 to 7.9 %), so that both variables fall in real terms. Income and output
fall even in nominal terms for larger values of the environmental tax rate.
Unemployment rate also increases monotonically (up to a dramatic 21.24%), so that 
there is no employment double dividend either. On the other hand, this reform achieves 
the largest emission reduction (reaching 10% for D=3), because the scale effect coming
from the activity reduction adds to the substitution effect. 
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INSERT TABLE 2 
When both reforms involving SO2 emissions are compared (see figure 2), it is 
remarkable the bad behavior of unemployment (which appears again as the most
sensitive variable) under the IT reform, jointly with a significant inflationary effect. Both 
of these variables improve under the PT reform, although in this case there is not a 
strong double dividend either. In return, as previously discussed, IT reform provides the 
largest reduction in emissions, which becomes now one of the most sensitive variables,
jointly with unemployment. The important role of SO2 emissions in Andalusia helps to 
understand the proportional (environmental) success obtained by aiming the tax reform
at this pollutant. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a CGE model is used to evaluate the environmental and economic effects 
of an ETR in the Andalusian economy, consisting of an environmental tax on CO2 or
SO2 emissions compensated by reducing either the Income Tax or the payroll tax of 
employers to Social Security. The results suggest the possibility to obtain an 
employment double dividend when any of the environmental taxes are compensated by 
reducing the payroll tax. In the case of the CO2 tax, it is also possible to obtain a
(limited) strong double dividend in the sense of increasing non-environmental welfare as
well as improving other economic variables, including inflation, real income and output.
E2004/0417
Some articles in the literature find evidence supporting the employment double dividend 
hypothesis when an ETR involving PT is performed (see Rodríguez, 2002; Bosquet, 
2000). Our results are in the same line and we can also conclude that it is crucial the way 
to recycle the income generated by the environmental tax. When PT is reduced it is
possible to obtain an employment (or even strong) double dividend, while it is not 
possible when selecting the IT, which is the main direct tax in the Spanish Tax System. 
From this point of view, our results show that PT seems to be a very strongly distorting 
tax, while IT is not, in comparison with the environmental tax. 
Concerning policy recommendations, our results show that an ETR involving a tax on 
SO2 or CO2 emissions and a reduction in the IT is likely to reduce pollution, and SO2
emissions seem to be relatively more sensitive to such a reform. Nevertheless, this policy 
would probably generate significant economic costs, including a loss of non-
environmental consumer welfare, real output and real income.
On the other hand, an ETR involving a tax on SO2 or CO2 emissions and a reduction in 
the PT is likely to get a more modest pollution cut, but will probably improve
employment and, if the CO2 emissions are the target, a limited improvement in non-
environmental welfare, economic activity (real output) and purchasing power (real 
income) can be expected.
Anyway, when assessing the possibility to obtain a double dividend from an ETR, two 
realistic general remarks, consistent with our results, should be made. Firstly, an 
environmental tax is a suitable instrument to improve environmental performance but, as 
noted by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), these taxes are also prone to cause further 
economic distortions, so that no economic improvement can be normally expected from
an environmental tax itself, but any economic benefit obtained from an ETR should 
rather be fully attributed to the reduction in some distorting tax, which could initially be 
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accomplished independently of any environmental policy. Secondly, and related to the
first observation, the classic economic statement “there is no free lunch” also applies in 
this context (see, for example, Fullerton and Metcalf, 1997). Namely, it is not possible to 
make a reform that provides at the same time very good environmental and economic
results. Typically, those reforms involving large environmental improvements (first 
dividend) also imply some non-negligible economic costs or, in the best of cases (if a
very distorting is reduced) some small economic benefits, so that the second –strong or 
employment- dividend is likely to be small or even negative. On the contrary, reforms
providing large economic improvements (second dividend) will normally cause, as a by-
product, rises in pollution which will dwindle the first dividend. 
Plausible future research lines include a more accurate analysis of the labor market and a 
study of the dynamic effect of this kind of reform.
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      ( A 1 )
where Qj is total output of sector j, Xdj stands for domestic output of sector j, Xrow j 
stands for foreign output of sector j, Ij is the scale parameter of sector j and ıj (1- ıj) is 
the elasticity of domestic (foreign) output. 
























min Xd   (A2) 
where Xij is the amount of commodity i used to produce commodity j, aij is the technical
coefficients measuring the minimum amount of commodity i required to get a unit of
commodity j, VAj stands for the value added of sector j and vj is the technical coefficient 
measuring the minimum amount of value added required to produce a unit of 
commodity j.
Value added in sector j is obtained from labor and capital according to a Cobb-Douglas 
technology:
j j






    ( A 3 )
where µj is the scale parameter of sector j, Ȗj is the elasticity of labor, lj  represents the 
amount of labor employed in sector j and kj represents the amount of capital used in 
sector j.
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CONSUMERS
The utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas type 
E D












   ( A 4 )
where CDj stands for consumption of commodity j, SD stands for savings of the 
consumer and Įj , ȕ measure the elasticity of consumption goods and savings. 
PUBLIC SECTOR
Indirect taxes:
Taxes on output, RP, are calculated as 
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where Ĳj is the tax rate on the output of sector j and ECj is the Social Security tax rate
paid by employees of sector j.
Social Security paid by employers, RLF,  is given by 
j
j
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     ( A 7 )
where tj is the tax rate on all the transactions made with foreign sector j, arwj represents
technical coefficients of commodities imported by sector j and rowp is a weighted price
index of imported good and services. 
Environmental tax revenue, RECO, is given by the following equation:
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where ecoj  is the environmental tax on sector j.
The Value Added Tax revenue, RVAT, is given by 
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(A.9)
where VATj is the tax rate ad valorem on (domestic and foreign) commodity j.
Direct taxes:
Social Security tax paid by employers, RLC, comes from
L w WC RLC       (A.10) 
where WC is Social Security tax rate for employers.
Income Tax, RI, is computed from
  w L WC TROW TPS cpi rK wL DT RI       (A.11)
where DT is the income tax rate, TPS stands for transfers from Public Sector to the
consumer (pensions, allowances, social benefits, unemployment benefits, …) and 
TROW stands for transfers from the rest of the world to the consumer.
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Table1. ETR with CO2 tax. Results summary. Change rate (%) with respect to benchmark levels.
Tax rate Compensated with Emissions Real GDP Real YD  Unemp. rate EV (*) CPI
PT -0.13 0.03 0.01 -0.39 4275.6 -0.20
t=0,5
IT -0.36 -0.17 -0.17 0.77 -70441.0 0.20
PT -0.25 0.05 0.02 -1.16 7603.4 -0.40
t=1
IT -0.71 -0.43 -0.43 1.54 -141208.4 0.50
PT -0.37 0.08 0.03 -1.54 10011.1 -0.60
t=1,5
IT -1.06 -0.60 -0.60 1.93 -212297.9 0.70
PT -0.49 0.08 0.02 -2.32 11526.8 -0.77
T=2
IT -1.41 -0.86 -0.86 2.70 -283706.0 1.00
PT -0.62 0.09 0.01 -2.70 12174.7 -0.95
T=2,5
IT -1.75 -1.03 -1.03 3.47 -355428.9 1.20
PT -0.74 0.10 0.01 -3.09 11979.4 -1.13
T=3
IT -2.09 -1.29 -1.29 4.25 -427463.2 1.50
Source: own elaboration from SAMAND90 and TIOMA90.
(*): EV in thousand euros.
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Table 2. ETR with SO2 tax. Results summary. Change rate (%) with respect to benchmark levels.
Tax rate  Compens. Emissions Real GDP Real YD Unemp. rate EV (*) CPI
PT -1.22 -0.25 -0.32 -1.54 -101012.7 -0.5
t=0.5
IT -1.95 -1.16 -1.17 3.47 -378046.8 1.20
PT -2.37 -0.59 -0.73 -2.32 -220379.1 -0.90
t=1
IT -3.80 -2.30 -2.34 6.95 -764093.7 2.40
PT -3.46 -1.03 -1.25 -3.47 -355697.0 -1.20
t=1.5
IT -5.55 -3.52 -3.60 10.04 -1157776.5 3.70
PT -4.50 -1.47 -1.77 -4.25 -505087.6 -1.50
t=2
IT -7.22 -4.81 -4.93 13.90 -1558897.4 5.10
PT -5.50 -2.01 -2.39 -5.02 -667069.3 -1.70
t=2.5
IT -8.83 -6.08 -6.23 17.37 -1967394.5 6.50
PT -6.46 -2.66 -3.12 -5.41 -840467.9 -1.80
t=3
IT -10.38 -7.32 -7.52 21.24 -2383318.3 7.90
Source: own elaboration from SAMAND90 and TIOMA90.
(*): EV in thousand euros.
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t=0 t=0.5 t=1 t=1.5 t=2 t=2.5 t=3
Emissions PT Emissions IT Real GDP PT Real GDP IT
Unemployment PT Unemployment IT Inflation PT Inflation IT
   Source: Own Elaboration29










t=0 t=0.5 t=1 t=1.5 t=2 t=2.5 t=3
Emissions PT Emissions IT Real GDP PT Real GDP IT
Unemployment PT Unemployment IT Inflation PT Inflation IT
Source: Own Elaboration.
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Notes
1 In the appendix the most important equations of the model are specified in detail. For further
information about the model see Cardenete and Sancho (2003).
2 The appendix specifies how every direct and indirect tax in the model is computed.
3 In this model, the government includes local and regional administrations, as well as those activities of
the central government in the region and any institution that is more than half financed with public funds.
4 Labandeira et.al. (2003) use a technically different (but conceptually similar) approach, by linking
pollution to energy consumption and production, and modeling the energy use decision of the producers.
With such an approach, the effect of the environmental tax happens through the energy use decision. In 
this paper, the environmental tax acts by providing incentives to increase the production of cleaner sectors
and reduce that of dirtier (energy-intensive) sectors.
5 Agencia de Medio Ambiente, Junta de Andalucía (1996).
6 Andalusian Ministry of Environment.
7 According to the Andalusian Energy Program, Andalusian industries are performing a big effort to cut
emissions down. By the end of the nineties, Andalusian industry had cut its emissions down to the 56% of
the overall polluting emissions in the region.
8 In 1993, the unemployment rate was 23.90% in Spain and 34.18% in Andalusia. In 2002, it was 11.36%
in Spain and 19.65% in Andalusia (data from the Andalusian Statistical Institute- IEA).
9 In fact, in the TIOMA90, SO2 data are measured in tons, while CO2 data are in thousand tons.
10 Labandeira and López-Nicolás (2002) criticize the exempt minimum of 1000 tons per year, suggested
by Durán and Gispert (2001) for being too high, so that, very few firms are subject to the tax. From an
empirical point of view, a high exempt minimum reduces the effectiveness of the tax, while, from a 
theoretical point of view, it erodes the ability to restore the efficiency that was lost because of the
environmental externality.
11 Sancho (1988), in a national-level study, and Cardenete and Sancho (2002), in a regional-level one,
show the distorting effects of PT on output prices and sectoral competitiveness.
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